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455 
PATENTS AS COMMERCIAL ASSETS IN POLITICAL, 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Adam Mossoff* 
CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL 
AND THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2015). PP. 268. HARDCOVER $ 35.00. 
Alexander Graham Bell is an icon of American invention. He is well known both in 
popular culture1 and to judges, lawyers, and academics.2 For many lawyers and legal schol-
ars, though, our knowledge of Bell and his famous telephone invention is most likely 
gleaned from excerpts of the Supreme Court’s famous decision in 1888 that affirmed the 
validity of his patent and its infringement by numerous telephone companies.3 Of course, 
these are excerpts, because this is the only Supreme Court case record and opinion that 
fills an entire volume of the United States Reports.4 This context has now been expanded, 
and the scholarly perspective of Bell’s patented innovation has been radically revised, by 
Christopher Beauchamp’s Invented by Law: Alexander Graham Bell and the Patent that 
Changed America.5 
The title of Beauchamp’s book, Invented by Law, makes it appear that his primary 
focus is the famous Supreme Court opinion and the multiple patent lawsuits that led to it. 
This assumption is understandable given the heavy emphasis in scholarship today on pa-
tent litigation in both empirical studies and theoretical analyses.6 It is also the impression 
created in the first few pages, in which Beauchamp notes that the answer to the hoary 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock! Mother Necessity, where would we be? (Am. Broad. Co. 1977) (“Ring me 
on the Alexander Graham Bell/Thank you Alexander for the phone/I’d never get a date/I’d never get a job/Unless 
I had a telephone”). 
 2. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 620 n.2 (2010).  
 3. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 92-97 (4th ed. 2007). 
 4. See Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888) (“The Telephone Cases”). 
 5. CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT 
CHANGED AMERICA (2015). 
 6. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent 
System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014) (assessing empirical claims about patent litigation); Eric R. Claeys, The 
Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825 (2015) (as-
sessing the eBay decision and the nature of injunctions in securing property rights). 
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question in American patent law, “Who is the inventor?,”7 includes as its answer both 
lawyers and judges.8 Beauchamp observes that “[t]he Bell litigation was one of the largest 
courtroom conflicts of any kind during the nineteenth century.”9 For many scholars and 
lawyers, a gripping tale of courtroom battles appears to await us in the following pages. 
But this assumption would be wrong—another example of the classic cliché that one 
should not judge a book by its cover. Beauchamp signals that patent litigation is not the 
primary focus, as he quickly points out that a complete analysis of “the effect of patents 
on society means looking at how they were exploited in practice, not just how they were 
litigated in the courts.”10 Accordingly, the litigation that gave rise to the Supreme Court 
case, known today as The Telephone Cases given that it consolidated appeals from many 
separate lawsuits, does not appear until well over one-third of the way into the book.11 
Before this point, Beauchamp surveys the rise of patents as commercial assets within their 
legal, political, and social context in America, which then sets the stage for Beauchamp’s 
careful and in-depth account of Bell’s similar commercial exploitation of his patented tel-
ephone.12 
In his characteristically engaging and witty writing style that presents facts he has 
culled from primary-source materials,13 Beauchamp does indeed cover the litigation cam-
paigns waged over the various patents on telephone technology throughout the United 
States and in Europe.14 But Invented by Law does much, much more than this.15 Beau-
champ details at great length the wide-ranging commercial, legal, social, and political con-
text in which inventions are created, patented, brought to market through myriad institu-
tional and commercial mechanisms, and ultimately brought to the courthouse.16 Thus, one 
of the most important insights from Beauchamp’s meticulous case study of Bell’s inven-
tion of the telephone is that “[p]atents were ultimately a tool of business” that “exist as 
landmarks in the history of technology only because economically motivated actors were 
willing and able to seek particular articles of intellectual property at particular times.”17 
Invented by Law simply cannot be given its proper due in a brief review essay, be-
cause there is so much in it of value to lawyers, historians, economists, and many other 
scholars.18 Thus, this essay will be limited to two issues of interest to lawyers and legal 
                                                          
 7. At least, this was the fundamental question before the America Invents Act of 2011, which altered the 
American patent system to a first-to-file system. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 
Stat. 284, 285. See id. at 285-86 (establishing the “effective filing date” of the patent application as the standard 
for assessing the novelty requirement). 
 8. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 5, 84. 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Id. at 8. 
 11. Id. at 78. 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5. See also Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-First-Patent-Litigation-
Explosion-Christopher-Beauchamp.pdf. 
 14. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 78, 148. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
 18. To take but one example of an important issue unaddressed in this review essay: Beauchamp presents an 
utterly fascinating account of how the economic theory of network effects and “lock in” are both confirmed and 
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scholars today simply because this review essay is published in a law journal. The context 
for these two issues is the recent patent war wrought by the wireless computing revolu-
tion—the smartphone war19—which has raised important questions and a heated policy 
debate about the role of patents in the innovation economy.20 As a result, lawyers and legal 
scholars will first find Invented by Law of interest, because Beauchamp carefully expli-
cates the investments, commercial innovation, business wrangling, and widespread licens-
ing of patents in the nineteenth century. This is significant, because the patent licensing 
business model and other complex forms of commercial development of patents are at-
tacked today in highly charged terms—the companies engaged in these practices are re-
ferred to by the epithet “patent trolls” and their licensing of patent portfolios are alleged 
to be entirely novel.21 Second, and closely related to this first point, the smartphone war 
itself is alleged to be a novel phenomenon, but Invented by Law presents an account of 
how cycles of innovation, litigation, and ensuing public policy debate about patents have 
been a constant feature in Anglo-American society since the Industrial Revolution. In sum, 
Invented by Law disabuses both of these mistaken historical assumptions in the patent pol-
icy debates today. 
It bears emphasizing, though, that Beauchamp is a first-rate historian, and thus he 
avoids the vice of engaging in “law office history.”22 Although he does nod briefly at times 
in the direction of these modern policy debates,23 the substance of his book focuses entirely 
on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in diligently reporting the historical facts. 
In so doing, though, Invented by Law presents a compelling historical account of patented 
innovation, and lawyers and legal scholars will find this valuable because it belies many 
assertions today about the commercial development of these patents and their extensive 
litigation as well. As Beauchamp puts the point: “all this has happened before, if not in its 
precise details, then at least in familiar outlines.”24 But the chief value in Invented by Law 
is not that it merely sheds light on contemporary policy debates. There is much in this 
monograph that is of deep interest to historians, economists, business school professors, 
and any others interested in the evolution of technology, commercial business models, and 
litigation and in other features of advanced legal systems and complex innovation-based 
economies. This is a book that will be richly mined for its many resources by lawyers and 
scholars of all stripes for many years to come. 
                                                          
called into question by the development of the telephone industry. Id. at 185-204. Institutional economists and 
legal scholars, among many others, will learn much from this discussion. 
 19. See Kirti Gupta & Mark Snyder, Smartphone Litigation and Standard Essential Patents 12 (Stan. Univ. 
Hoover Inst., Working Paper No. May 16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492331. 
 20. See, e.g., B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent Contro-
versy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825 (2014). 
 21. See infra notes 25-27. 
 22. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent 
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1011 (2007) (discussing in the context of patent 
law the ‘“law office history’ critique [of how] lawyers only use history for supporting preconceived policy 
goals”). 
 23. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 211-12. 
 24. Id. at 10. 
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I. PATENTS AS COMMERCIAL ASSETS 
Many people assert today that the commercial development of patented innovation 
through complex financial arrangements and myriad business models, such as licensing, 
is a relatively novel phenomenon.25 Third-parties investing in, selling or buying, or merely 
serving as commercial intermediaries in bringing patented innovation to the marketplace, 
especially through a licensing business model, is alleged not just to be new, but some assert 
that this novel practice is harmful because it leads to increased litigation.26 Many people, 
including even the eminent Judge Richard Posner, seem to believe that the original, his-
torical function of the patent system was simply to incentivize an inventor to become a 
manufacturer after receiving a patent for a new technological innovation.27 The policy 
question of whether licensing patents or patent portfolios, or engaging in other complex 
commercial uses of patents, should occur is beyond the scope of this review essay, which 
focuses on only how Invented by Law makes clear that these historical assumptions in 
today’s debates are profoundly mistaken. 
From its inception, Beauchamp explains that “the character of the Bell enterprise” 
was tantamount to a “high-tech start-up whose strategies were driven by investor relations 
and the [commercial] exploitation of patents.”28 This was neither new nor particularly 
unique to Bell. As Beauchamp notes, decades before Bell’s inventive and commercial ac-
tivities there arose in the mid-nineteenth century “industry leaders embracing innovation 
as a business strategy and using patents systemically to manage and control the [commer-
cial] process.”29  
Long before Bell patented his invention,30 a businessperson known as a “patent 
agent” (who was also sometimes a lawyer) became a common fixture in both the commer-
cialization and litigation of patents.31 Patent agents functioned as commercial intermedi-
aries for patent owners by licensing patent rights to manufacturers or retailers, selling and 
buying patents in what is now called the “secondary market,” and even filing lawsuits. 
Patent agents arose in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Beauchamp reports that 
in the first decade inventor Oliver Evans employed “licensing agents in six states” to com-
mercially exploit and “to institute litigation” on behalf of his patents in “flour-milling and 
steam engine technology.”32 Later in the 1830s and 1840s, patent agents facilitated Wil-
liam Woodworth’s commercial sale of his patents “to a syndicate that set out to enforce 
                                                          
 25. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in the Nineteenth Century, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 959, 966 n.44 (2014) (surveying claims by law professors who make this claim); Khan, supra 
note 20, at 837-39; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Patent Alchemy: The 
Market for Technology in US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 3-5, 34-36 (2013). 
 26. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its 
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 297 (2010) (“Recently, a secondary market for patents 
has flourished, making it more likely that patents that would otherwise sit on the shelf will end up in the court-
room.”). 
 27. See Mossoff, supra note 25, at 960 nn.6-7 (identifying claims by Judge Posner and others). 
 28. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 35. 
 29. Id. at 36. 
 30. See U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7, 1876). 
 31. See Mossoff, supra note 25, at 967-68. 
 32. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
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the patent,”33 they assisted Samuel Morse in his use of licensing as a way to promote the 
development of his patented electro-magnetic telegraph,34 and they were invaluable to 
Charles Goodyear’s similar use of licensing to commercialize his patented rubber.35 Many 
other inventors took advantage of these commercial intermediaries. In sum, it is evident 
that the complex commercial development of patents by third parties was a widespread 
feature of the American innovation economy from the first years of the patent system. This 
was the legal and commercial context in which Bell acquired investors for his inventive 
activities,36 patented his invention,37 purchased other patents,38 and converted his inven-
tion into real-world innovation through its commercial exploitation,39 as Beauchamp de-
tails throughout his monograph. 
But the marketplace innovation prompted by securing property rights in technolog-
ical innovation went far beyond the mere existence of commercial intermediaries like pa-
tent agents. Throughout the evolution of the technological advances in both the telegraph 
and the telephone, Beauchamp reveals how property rights in innovation (patents) were 
used as commercial assets in structuring the design of the firms who were investing in and 
deploying these assets in the marketplace.40 It is a story that involves not just Bell, but also 
his primary competing inventor, Thomas Edison, and Edison’s commercial partner of 
sorts, Western Union. The commercial choices by these individuals and companies, as 
well as the litigation campaigns they waged against each other, fundamentally shaped how 
the marketplace itself was structured and evolved over time. This evolution was not unique 
to the United States, either, as Beauchamp shows that similar commercial and legal battles 
played out in England between Bell, Edison, and their respective commercial firms, albeit 
in a different political and institutional context across the pond.41 
Through careful recounting of the many commercial dealings between the myriad 
actors in an innovation economy—between inventors and investors, between patentees 
and their corporate partners, between the corporate board members of patent-owning firms 
engaging in licensing or manufacturing, and ultimately between different patent-owning 
corporations themselves—Invented by Law provides an engrossing case study of “the close 
connection between intellectual property and organizational development.”42 What makes 
this case study such a fascinating tale to tell, and one that is highly robust in terms of the 
lessons it teaches, goes far beyond the cultural milieu of Bell and the telephone or even 
the prominent legal disputes that arose from it. The reason is that, as Beauchamp so deftly 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 24. 
 34. Id. at 25. 
 35. Id. at 25-26. 
 36. Id. at 38-39. 
 37. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 41-47. 
   38. Id. at 55. 
 39. See generally id. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. For instance, the British government’s monopoly on telegraphic communications, placed in its Post Of-
fice, uniquely affected both the legal and commercial developments of the telegraph in England, as Beauchamp 
so expertly details in Chapter 5 of Invented by Law. Id. at 109-29. 
 42. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 163. 
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shows, “broad patent rights took their place at the center of the telephone’s business his-
tory.”43 
There are far too many well-detailed examples of this point in Invented by Law to 
cover in this review essay and to try to do so would fail to replicate Beauchamp’s utterly 
engaging prose in presenting this same information. Also, just to be clear, the numerous 
patent infringement lawsuits were equally important, because the construction of the pa-
tents by attorneys and judges defined how these companies could leverage their intellec-
tual property against competitors in the marketplace. For instance, Beauchamp makes it 
very clear that the broad construction given to Claim Five of Bell’s first patent by various 
federal judges and then by the Supreme Court in Chief Justice Waite’s opinion, which 
handed ultimate victory to Bell, was key to the Bell Telephone Company’s success in 
gaining commercial dominance over the nascent telephone industry.44 Nonetheless, Beau-
champ also presents a gripping account of the differences between business models in 
comparing the railroad industry and the telephone industry in their respective uses of pa-
tent licensing, patent pools, and other private-ordering arrangements. 
This comparison is relevant to today’s policy debates, in keeping with the theme of 
this essay, because some academic commentators argue that the history of the railroad 
industry teaches important lessons for solutions to the smartphone war or to other problems 
allegedly caused by patents in today’s innovation economy.45 In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the railroads successfully fought off patent infringement lawsuits brought against 
them by patent agents and patent-holding companies through defensive associations; in 
effect, they pooled their finances and other resources to take a united stand in legally de-
fending themselves against what were then called “patent sharks.”46 Today, commentators 
argue that similar defensive associations should be created to defend against patent law-
suits, especially in the high-tech industry in which multiple patent rights cover both hard-
ware and software used in single devices sold to consumers, such as a smartphone.47 Sep-
arately from these academic proposals, some high-tech companies have been aggregating 
patents into defensive patent pools or have been creating cross-licensing arrangements that 
prohibit enforcement of patents.48 
But there is a key difference between the late-nineteenth century railroads and to-
day’s high-tech industry: Railroads did not rely on patents as the commercial fulcrum of 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 171. 
 44. Id. at 58-85. 
 45. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 389-90 (2012). 
 46. See id. at 390 (noting that “the effective organization of railroad groups was key to curbing the power of 
railroad patent sharks”); Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 59 (1947) (discussing patent “sharks” in the context of the patent wars involving farmers, 
who, similar to the railroads, formed defensive associations to fight them off). 
 47. See Chien, supra note 45, at 390 (noting that “these and other lessons from the past can help guide, 
redirect, and reassure current and future patent reform efforts”). 
 48. See, e.g., Raymond Millien, Defensive Patent Pools: There are Surprisingly Few Options, IPWATCHDOG 
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/12/10/defensive-patent-pools-there-are-surprisingly-few-op-
tions-2/id=31233 (describing defensive patent aggregator RPX and other defensive patent aggregators and 
pools); Brad Sheafe, Google’s Patent Starter Program: What it Really Means for Startups, CPIP  (Sep. 8, 2015), 
http://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/09/08/googles-patent-starter-program-what-it-really-means-for-startups (describing in 
part the LOT Network, which is a defensive cross-licensing patent pool). 
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their business models. Railroads did depend on patented innovation—patents secured the 
technological innovations that made it a viable transportation service.49 But the railroad 
companies used these property rights to internalize in single corporate entities the supply 
and distribution chains that constituted their business. Thus, as Beauchamp points out, the 
railroad companies built the tracks, owned the railway engines and cars, and directly sold 
rail service to customers.50 The railroads profited through a business model in which they 
directly owned all of the capital, both intangible and tangible, that they used to sell a ser-
vice in the marketplace. 
The telephone industry was structured very differently from the get-go. Beauchamp 
explains that after he received his patent, Bell initially tried to sell it to Western Union but 
failed.51 If he had been successful, it might have resulted in a similar corporate structure 
for the telephone industry as the railroad industry, as Western Union would have owned 
everything necessary to build, maintain, and sell telephone services. Instead, after this fail-
ure, Bell and his business partners formed the Bell Telephone Company, and they chose 
to license the company’s patents, creating a franchise business model to build and provide 
telephone service.52 
The result of Bell’s and his investors’ commercial decision meant that the telephone 
industry from the very beginning was disaggregated between different corporate entities 
in its supply and distribution chains. This is significant, because the only thing that kept 
them linked together in the marketplace were the patent licenses that controlled their re-
spective use and sale of the patented technology. As Beauchamp points out, “patent rights 
became the fundamental shaping influence on the competitive structure of telephone ser-
vice.”53 One byproduct of this fundamental decision as to their business model meant that 
patent lawsuits became one of the ways in which telephone companies like Bell Telephone 
and Western Union competed with each other, as each jockeyed for control of the patented 
technology that was the basis for their respective licensing business models. 
The upshot of this account of the early telephone industry’s licensing business model 
is that today’s high-tech industry more closely resembles this business model than the sin-
gle-firm business model of the railroad industry. The high-tech industry today lacks verti-
cal integration in a single corporate entity that produces, distributes, and sells smartphones 
and laptops used by consumers. Instead, different companies produce hardware, such as 
memory chips (e.g., Micron and Samsung), Wi-Fi chips (e.g., Qualcomm), processors 
(e.g., Intel and AMD), etc. Different companies create the software used in high-tech de-
vices (e.g., Microsoft, Apple, IBM, Google, Adobe, Mozilla, etc.). Different downstream 
companies then combine the hardware and the software into a single product that is sold 
                                                          
 49. See Adam Mossoff, A Simple Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L. REV. 707, 729-30 (2009) (dis-
cussing how the railroad displaced the canal system only after patented innovation, such as Westinghouse’s air-
brake, made it a feasible technology). 
 50. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 51. 
 51. Id. at 49. 
 52. Id. at 49-51. Notably, Samuel Morse and his business partners also created a franchise business model 
after Morse’s failure to sell his patented electro-magnetic telegraph to the U.S. government. See Adam Mossoff, 
O’Reilly v. Morse (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research, Paper No. 14-22, Aug. 18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2448363. 
 53. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 51. 
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to consumers, such as Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, HTC, etc. Even Apple, the com-
pany with arguably the most proprietary business model in the high-tech industry, licenses 
third parties to manufacture its famous computers and mobile devices; the elegant box in 
which an Apple device is sold to a consumer says, “designed in Cupertino,” not “manu-
factured in Cupertino.”54 What unites all of these distinct corporate entities in the vast, 
worldwide supply and distribution chains that comprise the high-tech industry are patent 
licenses and related contracts predicated on property rights. This market structure is similar 
to the nascent telephone industry of the late nineteenth century, not the railroad industry. 
Beauchamp’s in-depth historical analysis of the rise of the telephone industry in the 
late nineteenth century confirms that appeals today to railroad industry’s defensive patent 
litigation associations in the late nineteenth century are inapposite as sources of inspiration 
to any alleged patent litigation problems in the high-tech industry today. Although the 
telephone industry over the following decades ultimately gravitated toward consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions, its initial structure more closely paralleled today’s high-
tech industry in which the licensing of patents was the “organizing asset” of the first two 
primary companies, Bell Telephone and Western Union.55 Western Union made up for its 
failure to purchase Bell’s patents by purchasing patents on telephone technology from the 
famous inventor, Thomas Edison, as well as from other inventors.56 Bell also acquired 
patents from other inventors to buttress his position against Western Union and Edison.57 
Beauchamp explains that the initial competition and threats of litigation in the U.S. 
between Bell Telephone and Western Union ultimately concluded in the same way that 
many conflicts conclude in patent-intensive industries in which multiple patents owned by 
separate entities cover a single product sold in the marketplace: a patent pool.58 Given the 
structure of the high-tech industry in which different companies own different patents cov-
ering various aspects of a computing device, patent pools are used heavily.59 Unsurpris-
ingly, Bell Telephone and Western Union ended their legal dispute with “a pooling of the 
fundamental patents,” as each company held “a portfolio of patents on different aspects of 
voice-communication technology.”60 Through continued purchases and licenses, however, 
                                                          
 54. See Benjamin Kabin, Apple’s iPhone: Designed in California But Manufactured Fast All Around the 
World, ENTREPRENEUR (Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228315; Kenneth Rapoza, How 
Much of the iPhone is ‘Made in China’?, FORBES, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza 
/2012/01/31/how-much-of-the-iphone-is-made-in-china. 
 55. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 52. 
 56. Id. at 51-52. 
 57. Id. at 54-55. 
 58. Id. at 27, 53. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The 
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 205 (2011). 
 59. See, e.g., Terry Hart, Common Ground Between Creativity and Innovation, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (Oct. 
16, 2014), http://www.copyrightalliance.org/2014/11/common_ground_between_creativity_and_innovation#. 
ViEgVKRdEbw (“MPEG-LA pioneered modern patent pool practices in the 1990s. The organization privately 
developed a pool of all the essential technologies needed for the MPEG-2 format, used by DVD players and other 
digital video systems, and then offered a standardized license to manufacturers.”); Bill Geary & Chevy Chase, 
Patent Pools in High-Tech Industries, IAM MAGAZINE (Sept/Oct. 2009), http://www.iam-media.com/Maga-
zine/Issue/37/Management-report/Patent-pools-in-high-tech-industries (discussing MPEGLA and other patent 
pools). 
 60. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 53. 
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Bell Telephone ultimately gained ascendency and Western Union withdrew from tele-
phone service. 
This is not to say that there is no place for private-ordering mechanisms like defen-
sive patent pools in the high-tech industry. The successes of some defensive aggregators 
and defensive patent pools in the high-tech industry prove that there is a legitimate place 
for such pools.61 But these few successes reveal that purely defensive private-ordering 
solutions in the high-tech industry have limited applicability. The reason is that patent 
licenses comprise the fundamental commercial mechanisms for non-vertically-integrated 
firms in patent-intensive industries to contract with each other at all points along widely 
disbursed supply and distribution chains. In this commercial context, the high-tech indus-
try cannot organize around business models that do not rely on patents in this way, such 
as the railroad industry of yesteryear. Beauchamp does not compare the telephone and 
railroad industries for this purpose, nor does he explicitly compare the telephone to today’s 
high-tech industry, but his historical analysis is directly applicable to both the academic 
and real-world policy debates about business models and patent pools today.  
In this regard, there is one flaw, albeit minor, in Beauchamp’s wide-ranging histor-
ical analysis of the differing business models predicated on property rights in innovation 
(patents). At times, he makes it seem like the reliance on patents as commercial assets is 
entirely an arbitrary choice innovators make when structuring their business models. Beau-
champ says, for instance, that “[i]t is easy to imagine an alternative situation” for the tele-
phone industry’s commercial structure.62 Bell and his investors could have chosen to cen-
tralize all aspects of the supply and distribution chain for telephone service into a single 
corporate entity that did not rely on patents as the organizing feature of their business 
model. Instead, they made a different decision and chose a more disbursed model of com-
mercial organization between distinct corporate entities that as a result had to enter into 
patent licenses and contractual agreements to create these same supply and distribution 
networks. 
While Beauchamp is correct in the context of the railroad or telephone industries, it 
is not true that all industries are free from the demands of economic costs and benefits 
such that they are entirely free to choose how they structure their commercial organization 
and whether they rely on patents as the means to secure property rights in their products 
and services. Startups, for instance, require patents to create leverage against established 
industry giants or simply to prevent others from copying their innovative products and 
services; anecdotally, anyone who has watched Shark Tank can attest to this fact.63 Ac-
                                                          
 61. See, e.g., Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, A Decade of Linux Patent Non-Aggression: The Open Invention 
Network, ZDNET (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/a-decade-of-linux-patent-non-aggression-the-
open-invention-network. 
 62. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 51. 
 63. See Mary Juetten, Do Venture Capitalists Care About Intellectual Property?, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maryjuetten/2015/08/11/do-venture-capitalists-care-about-intellectual-property 
(“[Venture Capital] firms put their money where there’s IP. Look no further than Shark Tank. Have you ever 
watched an episode where the Sharks fail to grill the entrepreneurs on whether they have the appropriate IP 
protection?”). 
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cordingly, venture capitalists consistently report that they rely on patents in making in-
vestment decisions in startups although there is some variance among industries.64 These 
surveys and anecdotal reports are corroborated by a more formal, rigorous empirical study 
that finds a causal effect between a startup owning a patent and its ability to obtain financ-
ing from venture capitalists.65 Moreover, industries that require substantial ex ante re-
search and development costs with follow-on minimal marginal costs of production, such 
as the bio-pharma industry66 and software companies in the high-tech industry,67 also re-
quire the protections provided by intellectual property rights in order to recoup investments 
in R&D and to secure their freedom to commercialize the results of R&D in the market-
place.68 
But this is a small quibble compared to the impressive array of information, pre-
sented in a readable and engaging style, on how patents were utilized as commercial assets 
in licensing and in organizational development in the birth and early evolution of the tele-
phone industry. In fact, one learns from Beauchamp that the famous playwright George 
                                                          
 64. See Examining Recent Supreme Court Cases Before the Supreme Court: Hearing Before House Subcom-
mittee on the Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 52 
(2015) (statement of Robert P. Taylor on Behalf of Nat’l Venture Capitalist Ass’n), http://judici-
ary.house.gov/_cache/files/82249b9b-0dcc-460f-a873-95701adb6d82/114-2-93281.pdf. Taylor argued that 
 
[f]or thousands of companies . . . patents are the only way to ensure a return on investment 
sufficient to justify the risks involved . . . . This group includes companies developing dig-
ital technologies that employ innovative hardware and/or software, energy technologies, 
communication technologies, new polymers and metallurgical materials, information 
technologies, medical devices, biologics and pharmaceuticals. 
 
Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, 1280 (2009) (“Firms that seek venture-funding appear to be 
patenting more actively prior to the funding event (and for the purpose of securing funding), and venture-capital 
investors appear much less willing to fund companies that hold no patents.”). 
 65. See Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, The Bright Side of Patents (USPTO 
Econ. Working Paper No. 2015-5 Dec. 15, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2704028 (finding a causal effect be-
tween a startup having a patent and its obtaining venture capital financing and succeeding in the marketplace). 
 66. See BARRY WERTH, THE BILLION-DOLLAR MOLECULE: THE QUEST FOR THE PERFECT DRUG 111-37 
(1994) (discussing the early history of the modern pharmaceutical industry). Werth further writes: 
 
The birth of drug research in the 1930s had introduced a bristling new competitiveness as compa-
nies sought to protect their investments. Where patents were once reviled, they were now pursued 
ruthlessly. Squibb, which had one patent in 1920, had more than 200 by 1940. In 1937 alone, 
Merck had filed forty-six domestic and foreign patent applications. 
Id. at 122. 
 67. See Taylor, supra note 64, at 2. 
 68. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Commercial Value of Software Patents in the High Tech Indus-
try, CTR. FOR THE PROT. OF INTELL. PROP. (May 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/The-
Commercial-Value-of-Software-Patents.pdf (discussing commercialization function of patents in the software 
industry); John Edward Schneider, Microorganisms and the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not to Deposit, That is 
the Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 592, 592, 594 (1984) (noting that “[t]he revolution in biotechnology is one 
of the most important developments affecting industry in the twentieth century” and that the Supreme Court’s 
securing of patent protection in 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) “spurred the increased 
commercial interest in biotechnology”). See also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 36 (2013) (“The capitalists who finance these innovations will not 
do so without the promise of a reward. Intellectual property forms a necessary ingredient in this supply network: 
without the promise of reward, capital will not support innovation; without capital, innovation will often be fitful 
and inadequate.”). 
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Bernard Shaw worked briefly as a patent agent for the Edison Telephone Company in 
England.69 Others have noted that the equally famous American author Mark Twain also 
offered his services to Nicola Tesla to be his patent agent in Europe.70 The licensing busi-
ness model and related commercial activities involving patents were so common and well-
known at that time that everyone wanted to get into the business! Invented by Law is an 
excellent contribution to the growing literature on the long history of patents as commer-
cial assets, exploring, in the case of Bell’s telephone patent, how patented innovation was 
creatively deployed in the marketplace in a complex legal, political, and social context. 
II. INNOVATION, LITIGATION CYCLES, AND PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
Another aspect of Invented by Law that will be of much value to lawyers and legal 
scholars is Beauchamp’s discussion of nineteenth-century patent litigation generally and 
specifically with regard to telephone patents. Again, this is of interest because many claim 
that there has been an “explosion” in patent litigation in recent years,71 and that this unique 
explosion in litigation is allegedly harming innovation in the high-tech industry and else-
where.72 Many historians and economists, including Beauchamp himself in his other pub-
lications, have shown that this claim that there is massive patent litigation today unlike 
anything the U.S. has seen before is simply untrue.73 In fact, so-called “patent wars” have 
been a common feature in America since at least the early nineteenth century.74 Similar to 
the issue of patent licensing and other commercial uses of patents, Invented by Law pre-
sents evidence that today’s smartphone war is anything but new. 
In fact, by historical standards, the smartphone war is fairly small. The number of 
lawsuits in the smartphone war is around 200.75 In the telephone patent war, Bell and his 
                                                          
 69. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 116. 
 70. See Mossoff, supra note 25, at 970. 
 71. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 
402 (2013). 
 72. See, e.g., Patrick Hall, Patent Law Broken, Abused to Stifle Innovation, WIRED (July 2013), 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/07/patent-law-broken-abused-to-stifle-innovation; Sheri Qualters, Profes-
sors Issue Conflicting Views of Patent Reform, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nationallawjour-
nal.com/id=1202720328088/Professors-Issue-Conflicting-Views-of-Patent-Reform?slreturn=20160006105307 
(quoting Professor Michael Meurer) (stating that “there is clear harm to innovation caused by excessive patent 
litigation”). But see Letter from Forty Economists and Law Professors to House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-Profs-Letter-re-Patent-Re-
form.pdf (detailing extensive problems with Professor Meurer’s and others’ statistical claims today about the 
patent system); Adam Mossoff, GAO Report Confirms No “Patent Troll” Litigation Problem, CPIP (Oct. 4, 
2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/10/04/gao-report-confirms-no-patent-troll-litigation-problem (reviewing criti-
cism of Professor Meurer’s and others’ studies as being “nonrandom” and “nongeneralizable”). 
 73. Khan, supra note 20, at 837-38; Beauchamp, supra note 13. 
 74. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 58 (discussing the patent war over the sewing machine); Mossoff, supra 
note 52 (discussing patent war over electro-magnetic telegraph); Adam Mossoff, Top Ten Patent Wars (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author); Beauchamp, supra note 13 (discussing patent wars in nineteenth 
century over well drilling technology and other inventions); Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of 
the Early Aviation Patent Hold-Up – How a U.S. Government Monopsony Commandeered Pioneer Airplane 
Patents, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1 (2015) (discussing the patent war over the airplane). 
 75. See Gupta et al., supra note 19, at 12 (identifying number of smartphone lawsuits in a timeline graph). 
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business associates filed approximately 600 lawsuits alleging infringements of Bell’s pa-
tents on telephone technology.76 Similarly, in setting the historical context for this litiga-
tion campaign by Bell, Beauchamp reports that the telephone patent war was not unusual 
either.77 Among many other patent wars in the nineteenth century, two brothers who had 
an 1829 patent on a water-wheel filed more than 200 lawsuits in 1849 in a single state 
(Ohio).78 Further, in 1850, just one of their assignees filed 150 lawsuits in Philadelphia.79 
The conventional wisdom today about the allegedly unprecedented spate of patent litiga-
tion that is the smartphone war falls prey to a rigorous and unbiased review of the historical 
record. 
Moreover, the related claim that patent litigation is more complex, lengthy, and bur-
densome today than it was in yesteryear is also disabused in the pages of Invented by 
Law.80 To take but one small example: Beauchamp reports how in just one of Bell’s law-
suits, the defendant’s attorneys deposed “dozens of witnesses” and ultimately collected 
“eight thousand pages of testimony evidence over three and a half years.”81  The record of 
transcripts, motions, and related court documents before the Supreme Court in The Tele-
phone Cases was twenty-two volumes and fifteen-thousand pages.82 Such massive docu-
mentation for patent trials was not unheard of, as thousands of pages of depositions and 
other records were collected in the 1850s during the sewing machine war.83 It is important 
to guard against historical anachronisms, too, because this was a time before the modern 
technologies that have substantially reduced the transaction costs in producing legal doc-
uments and in interacting between lawyers, clients and judges, such as word processors, 
email, universal telephone service, faxes, automobiles, etc.  
Just as today, these massive nineteenth-century litigation campaigns produced nu-
merous legal, political, and social consequences. Today, there is a tremendous debate 
about the value and the role of patents in the innovation economy,84 and after repeatedly 
trying in previous years, this year Congress seemed to be on the precipice of enacting 
another major legislative overhaul of the patent system in the name of “reforming” patent 
litigation practices.85 Regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission are investi-
gating or taking actions in response to patent litigation and licensing practices.86 Lastly, 
                                                          
 76. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 12, 74. 
 77. Id. at 21-28. 
 78. Id. at 22. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 45, at 334-35 
 81. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 74. 
 82. Id. at 81. 
 83. See Mossoff, supra note 58, at 191 (reporting how in one lawsuit in the sewing machine war, a single 
deposition transcript was ‘“three thousand five hundred and seventy-five pages’”). 
 84. See sources cited supra note 64. 
 85. See, e.g., J.C. Boggs et al., Debate on Patent Reform Legislation Continues in Congress: What You Need 
to Know, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 12, 2015),  http://www.bna.com/debate-patent-reform-n17179934625; Dennis 
Crouch, Patent Reform Slows Down in Congress, PATENTLYO (July 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/pa-
tent/2015/07/patent-reform-congress.html. 
 86. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses the Complexity of 
Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001 (2015) (discussing the FTC’s ongoing inves-
tigation of patent licensing companies); Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Settles First Case Targeting ‘Patent Troll,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/business/ftc-settles-first-case-targeting-patent-
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the Supreme Court has been deciding patent cases in recent years at a rate not seen since 
the nineteenth century.87 These legislative, regulatory, and judicial activities have taken 
place in part in response to the rise of the smartphone war and the perception that there is 
an unprecedented amount of patent litigation,88 as well as in response to complaints that 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has sole jurisdiction over all patent 
appeals, was too solicitous in crafting legal rules in favor of patent owners.89 
As Beauchamp wisely observes early in Invented by Law, all of these legal and pol-
icy battles have happened before, and the saga of the telephone patent war illustrates this 
point.90 On both sides of the Atlantic, judges and justices proved amenable to attorneys’ 
arguments for very broad constructions of some of the key patents asserted in lawsuits 
filed in the United States and in England. In the United States, it was the extremely broad 
reading of Claim Five of Bell’s first patent—a claim Bell himself originally thought to be 
unimportant relative to the other claims in his patent—that gave the Bell Telephone Com-
pany legal and commercial control over all follow-on telephone technology for the life of 
Bell’s patent.91  In England, it was an equally broad reading of a patent that led to charges 
in the newspapers of “patent warping” by the judges.92 In both instances, the courts did 
this under the longstanding legal rule in both countries that “pioneer patents”—patents 
covering technological advances that create an entirely new field of endeavor—should be 
broadly construed in favor of the patentees.93 Of course, these cases were extremely com-
plex, just as patent lawsuits are today, with numerous arguments by defendants about lack 
of novelty or prior disclosure by the inventors in an attempt to invalidate the patents, as 
well as extensive arguments by defendants about technical minutia in an attempt to escape 
liability even if the patents were deemed to be valid. The extensive details on these points 
are thoroughly presented with great flair throughout Beauchamp’s Invented by Law. 
The purpose here is not to recount these details, which is impossible to do in a brief 
review essay, but rather to point out an interesting byproduct of this judicial eagerness to 
broadly construe patents, even when there is a colorable argument that such an interpreta-
tion may be unwarranted. As defendants in the telephone patent war lost in court with their 
legal arguments, they refocused their efforts on the other branches of the government, the 
executive and the legislative branches, who are more receptive to lobbying by special in-
terests. To wit, Beauchamp’s historical tale presents not just another case study in patents 
as commercial assets framed by background litigation but also a case study in how public 
                                                          
troll.html. 
 87. One-half of the total patent cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1972 have been decided in the past 
nine years (28 cases decided since 2006). See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, http://writ-
tendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015); Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fal-
lacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1688-89 n.4 (2013) (discussing comparison to nineteenth-century 
patent cases). 
 88. See supra notes 71-72. 
 89. See, e.g., William M. Landes et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 
128 (2004) (stating that the Federal Circuit has “pro-patent leanings”). 
 90. See generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 65-68, 80-85. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 155. Notably, Edison and Bell had joined forces in a single company in England by this time, and 
it was Edison’s follow-on technological contributions to the telephone that were now being used in the industry. 
 93. Id. at 62-63, 156-67. 
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choice theory worked in late-nineteenth-century patent law. 
This is not surprising. In the nineteenth century, it was common for defendants of 
patent infringement lawsuits and their public supporters to play on populist rhetoric. In the 
1840s, for instance, one prominent company sued by Samuel Morse for infringing his pa-
tented telegraph called itself “The People’s Line,”94 and its president attacked Morse and 
his business partners as a “monopoly” that infringed everyone’s “E qual Rights to all 
modes of Telegraphing.”95 This populist rhetoric continued in the telephone war: one 
prominent defendant named his company the “People’s Telephone Company,”96 and news-
papers supporting him attacked Bell’s company as an “odious monopoly.”97 Thus, when 
they lost in court, it is unsurprising that they “moved to exploit their political assets” in 
taking their arguments (and money) to the federal officials who would be more receptive 
and responsive—Congress and the Executive.98 
As Beauchamp details in Chapter 4, defendants lobbied Congress to enact various 
patent “reforms,” but, even with pressure on Congress from the public uproar over other 
patent litigation campaigns and congresspersons proclaiming a willingness to enact legis-
lation limiting or even abolishing patents, this proved futile.99 So the defending telephone 
companies eventually turned to the Executive Branch. Focusing their energies on a rela-
tively few number of relevant officials, such as Attorney General Augustus Garland, as 
opposed to hundreds of congresspersons, they achieved greater success, at least initially. 
Through classic cronyism, they convinced Attorney General Garland to initiate two sepa-
rate legal actions by the U.S. government, against Bell alleging that Bell had committed 
fraud on the patent office. These arguments, though, consisted entirely of the same legal 
arguments raised by the defendant companies and which had already failed in court; for 
example, that Bell’s patent was invalid because it was not novel. Beauchamp thus details 
how the government’s legal campaigns against Bell were dogged by scandal and beset 
with the to-be-expected inefficiencies that accompany “a thoroughly ad hoc mobilization 
of government power.”100 Beauchamp does not expressly frame these shifting legal and 
political strategies by accused infringers of Bell’s patent as an exemplar of public choice 
theory but for anyone schooled in this theory, the evidence is there. For instance, Beau-
champ notes at one point that lawsuits by the government, like those brought against Bell, 
“were disproportionately sought during high-stakes, sometimes highly political, patent 
struggles.”101 
We are again witnessing something similar today, at least in its broad outlines. In 
response to the perception that the Federal Circuit was too pro-patent, aggrieved defend-
ants and their allies, especially in the high-tech industry, took their arguments elsewhere.102 
                                                          
 94. Mossoff, supra note 52, at 41. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 74. 
 97. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 80 (internal quotations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 89. 
 99. Id. at 86-108. 
 100. Id. at 87. 
 101. Id. at 92. 
 102. Kellan Howell, Patent Law Reform Bill to Stop Trolls Could Also Stifle Innovation, Critics Say, WASH. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/5/patent-law-reform-bill-to-stop-trolls-
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They went to regulatory agencies in the Executive Branch, like the Federal Trade Com-
mission, which has held fact-finding conferences on the role of patents in the innovation 
economy103 and is now officially investigating patent licensing and whether this business 
model harms innovation.104 They also went to Congress, which began a process of consid-
ering “patent reform” legislation in 2007 that eventually produced the America Invents 
Act of 2011 and which continues to this day.105 They even went to the President. In 2015, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that Google, a prominent lobbyist for patent legislation,106 
has had in-person meetings with President Barak Obama “about 230 times, or an average 
of roughly once per week” since he took office in 2008.107 In 2013, President Obama par-
ticipated in a Google Hangout online chat in which he called for new legislation to stop 
patent-owners who allegedly “extort” money by filing lawsuits,108 and President Obama’s 
Council of Economic Advisors released a report that same year attacking “patent trolls” 
for harming innovation.109 These public policy arguments eventually awoke the sleeping 
giant in American law—the Supreme Court—which sprang into action in recent years and 
reversed many Federal Circuit’s decisions.110 
In Invented by Law, Beauchamp details how pro-patent and anti-patent forces ebbed 
and flowed throughout the nineteenth century as new technological innovation led to pa-
tent wars, which led to spirited public policy debates about patents and then to government 
action in at least one if not all three branches of the government. This pattern occurred 
again in the twentieth century, and it certainly is occurring again in the first couple decades 
of the twenty-first century. In the Syfy Channel’s version of the television series, Battlestar 
Galactica, the Cylons repeatedly intoned, “All of this has happened before, and all of this 
will happen again.”111 Beauchamp makes a similar invocation in his monograph, and the 
evidence he marshals for proving the historical premise in this proposition about cycles of 
                                                          
could-stifle (describing how in 2014, “Google spent about $17 million on lobbying, and the majority of its efforts 
were focused on patent reform. . . . Google spent more money than any other tech company on copyright, patent 
and trademark lobbying last year, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks campaign and 
lobbying expenditures”); Gene Quinn, The Hidden Agenda Behind Patent Reform, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/11/06/the-hidden-agenda-behind-patent-reform/id=46051 (describing exten-
sive lobbying for legislative revisions to patent system since before the America Invents Act of 2011). 
 103. See The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition (Mar. 2011), 
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-
and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf; Patent Assertion Entities Activities 
Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2012/12/patent-assertion-entity-
activities-workshop. 
 104. See Osenga, supra note 86, at 1004-13 (describing the FTC’s 6(b) study of “patent assertion entities”). 
 105. See Mossoff, supra note 87, at 1689 (describing the congressional and regulatory activities in response 
to the “clarion call for reform of the patent system”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Brody Mullins, Google Makes Most of Close Ties With White House, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 215, at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-makes-most-of-close-ties-to-white-house-1427242076. 
 108. See Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 435, 435 n.2 (2014). 
 109. See Council of Econ. Advisers, Nat’l Econ. Council, & Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, Patent Assertion and 
U.S. Innovation 1 (June 2013), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 110. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 
2 (2007) (noting as early as 2007 “a renewed interest in patent law by the Court and perhaps an increasing 
skepticism of the Federal Circuit’s ability to be the sole arbiter of patent law”). 
 111. See Battlestar Galactica (NBC Universal Television 2004-2007; Universal Media Studios 2007-2009). 
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innovation, patent litigation, and wide-ranging policy debate is overwhelmingly convinc-
ing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Invented by Law is a tour de force of historical scholarship on patent law that will 
prove valuable to lawyers, law professors, historians, academics, judges, and policy-mak-
ers for many years to come. Unfortunately, this brief review essay could touch on only a 
few issues of possible interest to readers. To show the relevance of this important mono-
graph to lawyers and others engaged in the patent policy debates today, this essay covered 
Beauchamp’s in-depth analysis of how patents functioned as commercial assets in the 
nineteenth-century innovation economy and how the massive patent wars that followed 
this innovation reflect the same public choice concerns that one might have about today’s 
patent policy debates waging in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere. 
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